5 Reasons Renting Still Beats Buying

This weekend I’ll throw $1,100 down the drain. That is to say, I’ll pay my rent. Pop-finance pundits have long used the drain cliché to describe how renters like me waste money, while homeowners with mortgages “pay themselves” and “build equity.”

In April 2007 I argued something different: Renting Makes More Financial Sense Than Homeownership. Basically, houses produce poor returns over long time periods while stocks and other investments produce good ones, and the outlook for houses is especially poor now, so I’d rather rent cheaply and funnel my extra cash into something other than a house.

Even though house prices have plunged and I have enough money to buy one, I’m still not nearly tempted. In what follows I’ll give five reasons. (The first two form the core of my original argument.) Before all this starts to sound too self-congratulatory, I’ll also explain the one big thing my essay got wrong.

Houses looked like smart investments in 2007. They had returned 9.3% a year for a decade, while stocks had returned just 5.9%. This year, with investors fleeing both houses and stocks, both probably look like a waste of money. But be careful about succumbing to what psychologists call recency bias — the tendency to form beliefs based largely on the most recent observations in a long series of data. For U.S. investors, reliable data on stocks and houses goes back well further than 10, 20 or even 50 years.

Stocks returned 7% a year for 200 years ended 2004, according to Wharton professor Jeremy Siegel. That’s after subtracting an average of 3% a year for inflation, or the gradual rise in prices of ordinary goods. The plunge in stock prices over the past 16 months makes me all the more sure that shares are poised to deliver good returns over the next decade or two. Houses returned 0.4% a year over 114 years ended 2004, according to Yale professor Robert Shiller, co-creator of the most widely used index for house prices. That number is suspiciously close to zero. Indeed, it might have been zero, reckons Shiller, if not for two periods of aggressive house buying, one spurred by government incentives following World War II and another created by the Federal Reserve’s drastic interest rate cuts in 2002 and 2003.

A zero return for houses might sound odd. An editor who re-published my original essay at another web site stuck the word “virtually” before zero, I suppose to soften the message. I made him take it out. If you think about it, zero is the only logical answer, so long as we’re talking about a single-family house and not, say, a rental building built to maximize income. Inflation, recall, is the gradual price rise of ordinary goods. What’s a house if not an ordinary good? Houses don’t spend their days thinking about ways to make themselves more valuable. They just sit there. Subtract inflation from their long-term price increases and there’s nothing left.

Apply heaps of leverage to the numbers if you like, but the outcome only worsens. Mortgage rates now are about as low as they’ve ever been, thanks to more government efforts to, among other things, spur house buying. But you’ll still pay 5.2% to capture long-term price increases that merely match inflation. And today, you’ll tie up a bundle of cash with a down payment. I’d rather pay cheap rent instead of an expensive mortgage and put the monthly cash I save into stocks and other investments. And rent is still plenty cheap, because . . .

Price matters. Few stock investors would think about buying shares of a company before looking at some measure of how expensive it is relative to the value it creates. They might look at the price/earnings ratio, for example. Houses have a price/earnings ratio of sorts — the ratio of their price to the yearly income they could generate if rented out. In April 2007 I noted that price/earnings ratios for stocks were only slightly above their historic average, while price/rent ratios for houses were double their average.

Stock prices were the thing I got wrong. The price/earnings ratio I gave was correct, but the earnings on which it was based were far from ordinary. The fierce housing boom was ringing cash registers at furniture stores, employing heaps of real estate agents, padding the profit statements of lenders and, thanks to home equity loans, puffing up buying power for just about everything. I should have realized that America’s corporate profit was close to a third above normal levels as a percentage of gross domestic product. Profits have reverted to average levels, and stocks have fallen to around 14 times earnings. I recently cautioned readers that, even though stocks are fairly priced, it’s natural to assume that after a long period of above-average prices we can enter a few years of below-average ones.

Houses still seem expensive, though. One recent survey by Moody’s Economy.com found that the price/rent ratio in major markets had fallen to 20 from 24 three years ago, but that for 16 years ended 1999, before the house-buying spree began in earnest, it had stayed below 15.

Numbers like those should inform not only house-buying decisions, but public policy. If a citizen is being made poor by the debt they carry on the house they bought, and if a government policy keeps them tied to that house instead of separated from it into more affordable housing, are we really helping them?